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1 Introduction
Network structures play an important role in many economic situations. The types of
networks that I consider in this chapter are those that connect many individuals who
each must establish and maintain their own links. I refer to such networks as commu-
nication networks; they describe the bilateral channels through which individuals can
communicate and thereby coordinate their actions. The worth that coalitions of indi-
viduals can obtain by coordinating their actions is modeled by a coalitional game, which
specifies for each coalition S of individuals a worth v(S). Suppose, for example, that
there are three individuals, one seller who has one indivisible unit of a good for sale, and
two potential buyers. Suppose the value of the good is 0 to the seller (s), 1 to the first
buyer (b1), and 2 to the second buyer (b2). This situation can be modeled as a coali-
tional game with player set {s, b1, b2} and v({s}) = v({b1}) = v({b2}) = v({b1, b2}) = 0,
v({s, b1}) = 1, and v({s, b2}) = v({s, b1, b2}) = 2. If only the two buyers are linked (the
only link formed is b1b2), then the seller cannot communicate with any of the buyers,
so that no worth can be generated. If the seller is linked to the first buyer and the
first buyer, in turn, is linked to the second buyer (the two links sb1 and b1b2 have been
formed), then all three can communicate and coordinate their actions (the seller and
the second buyer do so through the first buyer) and a worth of 2 can be generated by
selling the good to the second buyer.
Note that in the approach based on coalitional games as explained above, the worth
that players in a network can obtain primarily depends on which players are connected
with one another (directly or indirectly) and not on how exactly these players are
connected. Hence, issues such as the deterioration of information as it has to travel
along longer paths are not taken into account. When we want to take these types of
issues into account, we end up in the realm of value functions on networks, which are
covered in Jackson (2004). Also, the approach based on coalitional games precludes
externalities between diﬀerent groups of interconnected players; the worth generated
by a group of interconnected players does not depend on whether or not players not in
the group are connected to each other.
I illustrated above how the worth that the players can obtain depends on the net-
work. The discussion there concentrated on the worth that can be obtained by the
players as a group if they cooperate. This does not address the issue of how this worth
will then be divided among the players. In general, this division will depend on the po-
sitions that the players take in the network. For example, if in the situation described
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above the two links sb1 and b1b2 have been formed and the worth 2 is generated by
selling the good to the second buyer, then the first buyer might get some share of the
profits of the sale because his cooperation is needed for the seller and the second buyer
to make a deal as they cannot communicate directly (link sb2 has not been formed). If,
on the other hand, link sb2 has been formed, then the worth 2 can still be generated by
selling the good to the second buyer, but now the seller and this second buyer do not
need the assistance of the first buyer to complete the transaction and it seems reason-
able that the seller and the second buyer will share the worth 2 between themselves in
some way. The specific way in which the worth generated by the players in a network
is shared among them is specified by an allocation rule. In most of the models that I
describe in this chapter, it is assumed that such an allocation rule is exogenously given
and the players decide which links to form given this allocation rule.1
A network is a collection of bilateral links between players who must establish and
maintain their own links. Forming or not forming certain links is a strategic decision
for each player forming them, as such links have an influence on the position that this
player will take in the network and thereby have an influence on the payoﬀ that the
player expects to obtain, as specified by the allocation rule. Because the formation of
links is a strategic decision, it is appropriate to model network formation as a non-
cooperative game. Perhaps the simplest possible way to model network formation is
by means of a strategic-form game in which players simultaneously announce which
links they want to form and in which a link between two players is formed if and only
if both these players want to form it.2 In this model, every network can emerge in
a Nash equilibrium when the underlying coalitional game and the allocation rule are
such that every player wants to have as many links as possible. This is because it takes
the consent of two players to form a link, so that a single player cannot form any new
links through unilateral deviation. This motivates the study of refinements of Nash
equilibrium for network-formation models.
In this chapter, I discuss the various (non-cooperative) models of network formation
in coalitional games that have been studied in the literature. The questions answered
for these models are which networks can be formed according to Nash equilibria or
refinements thereof and what the payoﬀs are to the players in such networks. The
models illustrate how diﬀerences in the circumstances under which the players are
1The exception is the model in Section 7, in which players bargain over link formation and payoﬀ
division simultaneously.
2This model is described in Section 4.
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forming links and diﬀerences in ways in which jointly generated profits are distributed
between them influence the networks they form.
I shall proceed according to the following outline.
1. Introduction
2. Definitions
3. Network-Formation Game in Extensive Form
4. Network-Formation Game in Strategic Form
5. Comparison of the Network-Formation Models in Extensive and Strategic Forms
6. Network Formation with Costs for Establishing Links
7. Simultaneous Bargaining over Network Formation and Payoﬀ Division
8. Related Literature
9. References
2 Definitions
All the models that I cover in this chapter start from a coalitional game (N, v), in
which N = {1, 2, ..., n} is the set of players and v : 2N → IR is the characteristic
function that assigns to each coalition S ⊆ N of players a worth v(S). It is always
assumed that v(∅) = 0. The interpretation of the worth v(S) of a coalition S is that
this is the payoﬀ that the members of S can obtain for themselves if they coordinate
their actions, independently of the actions taken by the players who are not included
in the coalition. However, in order to coordinate their actions, players have to be able
to communicate.
Communication takes place through bilateral channels, which I refer to as (commu-
nication) links. The link between players i and j is denoted by ij and the set of all pos-
sible communication links between the players in N is denoted by gN = {ij | i, j ∈ N,
i 6= j}. In the models that I survey, it takes the consent of both players to form the
link between them and an existing link ij can be used costlessly by both players i and
j. A network is a pair (N, g), where N is the set of players and g ⊆ gN is a set of
links. When this does not lead to confusion, a network (N, g) is identified with its set
of links and is simply denoted g. The network with all possible links, gN , is referred to
as the complete network. In a network g, two players can communicate (and, hence,
coordinate their actions) if and only if there exists a path of communication between
them. A path in g between players i and j is a sequence of players i = i1, i2, ..., it = j
with t ≥ 2 such that ikik+1 ∈ g for each k ∈ {1, 2, ..., t − 1}. If there exists such a
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path with t = 2, then ij ∈ g and players i and j can communicate directly. Players
can communicate indirectly through other players if there exists a longer path between
them. Players who are not connected by a path are in diﬀerent components of the
network, while players who are connected by a path are in the same component. The
component containing player i is denoted Ci(g) = {j ∈ N | j = i or j and i are
connected by a path in g}, and the set of all components of network (N, g) is denoted
by π(N, g) = {Ci(g) | i ∈ N}. Network (N, g) is connected if it contains only one
component, i.e., if Ci(g) = N for each i ∈ N , so that all players can communicate with
each other.
A coalitional game and a network comprise a communication situation. Formally,
a communication situation is a triple (N, v, g), consisting of a player set N , a charac-
teristic function v, and a set of links g. I am interested in the formation of links given
a coalitional game (N, v) and I denote the set of all communication situations with
player set N and characteristic function v by CSNv .
For a communication situation (N, v, g), the network-restricted game (N, vg) incor-
porates both the possible gains from cooperation for coalitions of players as modeled
by the coalitional game (N, v) and the restrictions on communication reflected by com-
munication network g. The players in a coalition T ⊆ N have available the links in
g(T ) = {ij ∈ g | i ∈ T and j ∈ T} and this induces a partition π(T, g) of this coalition
into the components of the network (T, g(T )). The players in T can only coordinate
their actions within these components. This motivates the definition of the character-
istic function vg as vg(T ) =
P
C∈π(T,g) v(C) for each T ⊆ N . Note that this definition
implicitly assumes that there are no externalities between diﬀerent components of a
network; the worth of the players in a network is simply the sum of the worths of
its components. Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) refer to this property as component
additivity of the value function that assigns a value to every network. This property
of the network-restricted game derived from a coalitional game is in accordance with
the interpretation of the coalitional game that it assigns to each coalition of players
the worth that they can obtain independently of the other players. In addition, the
definition of the characteristic function vg is such that the worth of a coalition of play-
ers who form a component of a network does not depend on exactly which links exist
between these players, but only on whether or not these players are connected at all.
This reflects the interpretation of the links as (costless) communication channels which
allow players to cooperate.
Using the network-restricted game (N, vg), Myerson (1977) defined an allocation
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rule for communication situations. An allocation rule on a class CS of communication
situations is a function γ that assigns to each communication situation (N, v, g) ∈ CS
a payoﬀ vector γ(N, v, g) ∈ IRN . If allocation rule γ is used, then a player i ∈ N
expects to get a payoﬀ γi(N, v, g) from being in communication situation (N, v, g). The
Myerson value µ is the Shapley value Φ (cf. Shapley (1953)) of the network-restricted
game;
µi(N, v, g) = Φi(N, vg) =
X
T⊂N :i/∈T
|T |!(|N | − 1− |T |)!
|N |!
(vg(T ∪ i)− vg(T )) .3
The Myerson value is by far the most widely used allocation rule for communication
situations in the literature. One of the reasons for this popularity is undoubtedly the
firm axiomatic grounding of this allocation rule. Myerson (1977) showed that for any
coalitional game (N, v) the Myerson value is the unique allocation rule on CSNv that
satisfies the two properties component eﬃciency and fairness. Component eﬃciency
of an allocation rule means that the players in a component distribute the value of
this component, which they can obtain for themselves irrespective of the actions taken
by the players not in the component, among themselves. Fairness reflects the idea
that two players should gain or lose equally from forming the link between them. An
allocation rule is fair if the payoﬀs of two players i and j in- or decrease by the same
amount whenever the link connecting them is severed.4
Several other allocation rules for communication situations appear in the litera-
ture. The main one is the position value (cf. Borm et al. (1992)), which focuses on
the importance of the communication links rather than the role of the players. Find-
ing an axiomatic characterization of this allocation rule for a fixed coalitional game
and variable networks has proven rather elusive over the years, but Slikker (2003) re-
cently succeeded in finding such an axiomatic characterization. He uses two axioms
in his characterization of the position value, component eﬃciency and balanced total
threats. Balanced total threats is reminiscent of the balanced contributions axiom that
Myerson (1980) used to axiomatize the Myerson value and that can replace fairness in
a characterization of the Myerson value. The axiomatization of the position value may
well lead to new applications of this allocation rule in the future.
I will cover both extensive-form games of network formation and strategic-form
ones. The network-formation game in extensive form is most easily described casu-
3Here, |T | denotes the number of elements in a set T . Also, following popular tradition, I omit the
set brackets { and } when I don’t think such an omission will cause the reader any confusion.
4Jackson (2003) refers to this property as equal bargaining power.
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ally and I will do exactly that in Section 3. A game in strategic form is a tuple
(N, (Si)i∈N , (fi)i∈N) consisting of a player set N , a strategy set Si for each player
i ∈ N , and a payoﬀ function fi :
Q
i∈N Si → IR for each player i ∈ N . In such a game,
every player i ∈ N chooses one of his strategies si ∈ Si and then each player i gets a
payoﬀ fi(s), where s = (si)i∈N denotes the strategy profile chosen. A strategy profile is
a Nash equilibrium (cf. Nash (1950)) if no player can increase his payoﬀ by unilaterally
deviating to a diﬀerent strategy. In formula, s ∈ Qi∈N Si is a Nash equilibrium if for
each player i ∈ N and each strategy ti ∈ Si it holds that fi(si) ≥ fi(ti, s−i), where
s−i = (sj)j∈N\i denotes the (fixed) strategies of the players other than i and (ti, s−i)
denotes the strategy profile in which player i plays his strategy ti and every player
j ∈ N\i plays his strategy sj.
I will use several refinements of Nash equilibria. A strategy si of a player i is
undominated if there is no other strategy that gives this player at least as high a
payoﬀ and sometimes a higher payoﬀ, for all possible strategy choices of the other
players. Hence, si ∈ Si is undominated if there is no other strategy ti ∈ Si such that
fi(si, s−i) · fi(ti, s−i) for all s−i ∈
Q
j∈N\i Sj, with the inequality being strict for at
least one s−i. An undominated Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium in which each
player plays an undominated strategy.
A strong Nash equilibrium (cf. Aumann (1959) and Bernheim et al. (1987)) is
a strategy profile that is stable against deviations not only by single players, but by
any coalition of players. Hence, s ∈ Qi∈N Si is a strong Nash equilibrium if for each
coalition T ⊆ N it holds that there is no strategy tuple tT = (ti)i∈T ∈
Q
i∈T Si such
that fi(tT , sN\T ) ≥ fi(s) for all i ∈ T and fi(tT , sN\T ) > fi(s) for at least one i ∈ T .
This definition of strong equilibrium is actually slightly diﬀerent from that put forward
in Aumann (1959) and Bernheim et al. (1987) in that it allows a coalition to deviate
to a strategy profile that strictly increases the payoﬀs of some of its members without
decreasing those of the other members, whereas the original definition allows only
deviations that strictly increase the payoﬀs of all members of a deviating coalition.
Both interpretations of strong Nash equilibrium are prominent in the literature, and
in most games the two definitions lead to the same sets of strong Nash equilibria, but
the one that I use here is slightly more appealing in the context of network-formation
games (see, eg. Jackson and van den Nouweland (2001)).
Coalition-proof Nash equilibria (cf. Bernheim et al. (1987)) are similar to strong
Nash equilibria in that they require a strategy profile to be stable against deviations by
all coalitions of players. However, in a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, the deviations
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are restricted to be stable themselves against further deviations by subcoalitions. To
provide the formal definition of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, which is inductive,
I need some additional notation. Let Γ = (N ; (Si)i∈N ; (fi)i∈N) be a game in strategic
form, T ⊂ N a coalition, and s∗N\T ∈
Q
i∈N\T Si. The strategic-form game Γ(s∗N\T ) =
(T ; (Si)i∈T ; (f
∗
i )i∈T ) induced on the players of T by the strategies s
∗
N\T has payoﬀ
functions f∗i :
Q
i∈T Si → IR given by f∗i (sT ) = fi(sT , s∗N\T ) for all sT ∈
Q
i∈T Si, for
each i ∈ T . In a 1-player game ({i};Si; fi), a strategy s∗i ∈ Si is a coalition-proof Nash
equilibrium if s∗i maximizes fi over Si. Let Γ = (N, (Si)i∈N , (fi)i∈N) be a game with
|N | > 1 players and suppose that coalition-proof Nash equilibria have been defined
for games with fewer than |N | players. A strategy profile s∗ ∈ Qi∈N Si is called self
enforcing if for all T ⊂ N , it holds that s∗T is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium of the
game Γ(s∗N\T ). A strategy profile s
∗ is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium of Γ if s∗
is self enforcing and there is no other self-enforcing strategy profile s ∈ SN such that
fi(s) > fi(s
∗) for all i ∈ N .
The last refinement of Nash equilibria that I use is defined only for strategic-form
games that are potential games. A game (N ; (Si)i∈N ; (fi)i∈N) is a potential game (cf.
Monderer and Shapley (1996)) if there exists a potential function P :
Q
i∈N Si → IR such
that for every strategy profile s ∈ Qi∈N Si, every i ∈ N , and every ti ∈ Si, it holds that
fi(si, s−i)−fi(ti, s−i) = P (si, s−i)−P (ti, s−i). The function P provides information on
changes in payoﬀs for every player when he changes his strategy choice unilaterally. For
a potential game, the potential maximizer selects the strategy profiles that maximize a
potential function P . Monderer and Shapley (1996) prove that the potential maximizer
is a well-defined refinement of Nash equilibria. Ui (2001) shows that Nash equilibria
that maximize a potential function are generically robust, and Garratt and Qin (2001)
provide justification for using the potential maximizer in network-formation games.
3 Network-Formation Game in Extensive Form
Network-formation games in extensive form were introduced by Aumann and Myerson
(1988). The network-formation process in these games is sequential. Pairs of players
get opportunities to form links according to some exogenous rule of order on the links.
Links are formed one at a time and players observe which pairs of players form links
or decline to form links as the game progresses. Moreover, links cannot be broken once
they have been formed. After each pair of players has had an opportunity to form
a link, in the order determined by the exogenous rule of order, every pair of payers
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that has declined to form a link is given another opportunity to do so, in an order
determined by the same rule of order. This processes is repeated as long as new links
are formed in each round but it stops when, after the latest link has been formed, all
pairs of players who have not formed a link have had one final opportunity to change
their minds and form it, but declined. The payoﬀs to the players are those found
by applying the Myerson value µ to the network that is formed in combination with
an underlying coalitional game. The network-formation game in extensive form as
described above with underlying coalitional game (N, v), exogenous allocation rule µ
(the Myerson value), and exogenous rule of order σ on all possible links between the
players in N , is denoted by ∆nf(N, v, µ,σ).
For the extensive-form games of network formation ∆nf(N, v, µ,σ), no general re-
sults have been obtained to the best of my knowledge. ’Results’ for these games
are limited to a series of examples that illustrate which networks are supported by
subgame-perfect Nash equilibria of the network-formation games for various underly-
ing coalitional games. A subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium is a profile of strategies,
one for each player, that satisfies the requirement that at each point in the game every
player’s strategy gives him the highest possible payoﬀ in the remainder of the game,
given the strategies of the other players.5
The following example is taken from Aumann and Myerson (1988) and shows that
for a superadditive coalitional game, the extensive-form network-formation process
might not lead to the formation of a complete network or even a connected network. A
coalitional game (N, v) is superadditive if any two disjoint coalitions of players T and
R (so, T ∩ R = ∅) can only benefit from joining forces, i.e., v(T ∪ R) ≥ v(T ) + v(R).
Example 1 Consider player set N = {1, 2, 3} and assume that the economic possi-
bilities of the players are captured in the superadditive coalitional game (N, v), where
v(T ) = 0 if |T | · 1, v(T ) = 60 if |T | = 2, and v(N) = 72. For this underlying game,
the payoﬀs to the players as determined by the Myerson value for the various possible
networks are as follows. In the empty network, every player receives zero;
µi(N, v, ∅) = 0 for each i ∈ N.
In a network with one link, the two linked players equally divide the value of a 2-player
5Subgame-perfect Nash equilibria always exist for these games because they are finite and have
perfect information.
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coalition and the isolated player gets zero;
µk(N, v, {ij}) =



0 if k /∈ {i, j};
30 if k ∈ {i, j}.
In a network with two links, the payoﬀs are
µr(N, v, {ij, jk}) =



44 if r = j;
14 if r ∈ {i, k}.
Finally, in the complete network each player receives the same payoﬀ and
µi(N, v, g
N) = 24 for each i ∈ N.
To find which networks are supported by subgame-perfect Nash equilibria of the
game ∆nf(N, v, µ,σ), first note that each player receives a positive payoﬀ if he forms
any links at all, whereas all players receive zero if no links are formed. It follows that
at least one link will be formed in a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. So, suppose
that exactly one link has been formed, say link ij. If no additional links are formed,
players i and j will each receive a payoﬀ of 30. Note that if one of them, say i, forms
a link with the remaining player k, he would increase his payoﬀ to 44. However, in
the network (N, {ij, ik}) players j and k receive only 14 and they can increase their
payoﬀs to 24 by forming link jk. Hence, none of the players i and j will form a link
with player k, as this will cause the other player to do so as well and both their payoﬀs
will be only 24, rather than the 30 they each get in the network (N, {ij}). This shows
that in a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium exactly one link will be formed. The order
σ on the links is not important in the sense that for any order σ and for any one of the
three links, there is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium that results in the formation of
this particular link, as is discussed in detail in Slikker (2000).6
As for superadditive coalitional games the extensive-form network-formation process
might not lead to the formation of a complete network, some research has focussed on
strengthening the requirement of superadditivity to convexity. A coalitional game
(N, v) is convex if a player’s contribution to a coalition increases (weakly) with the size
of the coalition he joins, i.e., for any player i and any two coalitions T,R ⊆ N\i with
T ⊆ R, it holds that v(T ∪ i) − v(T ) · v(R ∪ i) − v(R). Convexity of a coalitional
6For some games, the order σ might influence which networks are supported by subgame-perfect
Nash equilibria. Slikker and van den Nouweland (2001a) demonstrate this in example 6.2.
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game seems to provide strong incentives for players to cooperate in the largest possible
coalition. It is a long-standing open conjecture that for a convex coalitional games,
subgame-perfect Nash equilibria of the extensive-form game of network formation sup-
port the complete network. This conjecture was addressed in van den Nouweland
(1993) and later in Slikker and Norde (2000). Van den Nouweland (1993) shows that
the conjecture holds true if a second conjecture holds. This second conjecture is that
for any convex game and any network that is not the complete network, there exist
two players who have not formed a link and whose Myerson values in the network are
weakly smaller than their respective Myerson values in the complete network. How-
ever, this second conjecture was disproved by an example due to R. Holzman (private
communication), which can be found as example 6.3 in Slikker and van den Nouweland
(2001a).
Slikker and Norde (2000) study the extensive-form network-formation games
∆nf(N, v, µ,σ) for underlying games that are convex and symmetric. A coalitional
game (N, v) is symmetric if the worth of every coalition of players depends only on
how many members it has, i.e., v(T ) = v(R) for all coalitions T,R ⊆ N with |T | = |R|.
The additional requirement of symmetry makes it easier to analyze a game because
it reduces its complexity considerably. Slikker and Norde (2000) are able to show
that for convex symmetric coalitional games with at least two and at most five play-
ers the complete network is supported by a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the
extensive-form games of network formation ∆nf(N, v, µ,σ), for any order σ. More-
over, they are able to show that for strictly convex7 symmetric games (N, v) with at
least two and at most five players it holds that any network (N, g) that is supported
by a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium is payoﬀ equivalent to the complete network,
i.e., µ(N, v, g) = µ(N, v, gN). This result cannot be extended to games with more
than five players. Slikker and Norde (2000) study a 6-player strictly convex symmet-
ric game (N, v) and show that for this game there exist networks that are not payoﬀ
equivalent to the complete network but that are supported by subgame-perfect Nash
equilibria of network-formation games ∆nf(N, v, µ,σ). However, it is still an open
question whether for (strictly) convex (symmetric) games with more than five play-
ers the complete network is supported by a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the
extensive-form network-formation games.
7A game (N, v) is strictly convex if the convexity inequalities all hold with strict inequality, i.e.,
for any player i and any two coalitions T,R ⊆ N\i with T ⊂ R, it holds that v(T ∪ i) − v(T ) <
v(R ∪ i)− v(R).
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Other coalitional games for which the extensive-form network-formation game has
been studied are weighted majority games. A weighted majority game is a game
that results from a situation in which each player i ∈ N has a number of votes, wi,
and in which a coalition of players needs a total of q votes (the quota) to obtain
the surplus, which is normalized to equal 1. The tuple (N, q, (wi)i∈N) is a weighted
majority situation. To avoid the existence of two disjoint coalitions of players that
can obtain the surplus, it is assumed that 1
2
P
i∈N wi < q. The characteristic function
v of the weighted majority game (N, v) associated with weighted majority situation
(N, q, (wi)i∈N) is defined by
v(T ) =



1 if
P
i∈T wi ≥ q;
0 otherwise
for all T ⊆ N .
The following example considers a weighted majority game with one powerful player
and several small ones, a so-called apex game. This example is due to Aumann and
Myerson (1988).
Example 2 Consider the weighted majority situation (N, q, (wi)i∈N) with player set
N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, quota q = 4, and numbers of votes w1 = 3 and w2 = w3 = w4 =
w5 = 1. Player 1 has more votes than each of the other players, but still needs at least
one of the players with few votes to obtain the surplus. Also, the players with few votes
can obtain the surplus without player 1 if all four of them cooperate. The characteristic
function of the associated weighted majority game (N, v) is
v(T ) =



1 if T = {2, 3, 4, 5} or if 1 ∈ T and |T | ≥ 2;
0 otherwise.
Note that players 2 through 5 are symmetric in this game. Consequently, it suﬃces
to only discuss the payoﬀs for some possible networks and those for other networks can
be found using this symmetry. If only a link between player 1 and player 2 is formed,
then these two players depend on each other to obtain the surplus. This is expressed in
the Myerson value, which gives each of them 1
2
. Of course, all isolated players receive
0. Player 1 can increase his payoﬀ by linking with more players with few votes, as this
will decrease player 1’s dependence on these other players. In a network in which the
three links between players 1, 2, and 3 are formed, player 1 gets 2
3
, while players 2 and
3 get 1
6
each. In a network in which the 6 links between players 1, 2, 3, and 4 are
formed, player 1 gets 3
4
while players 2, 3, and 4 get 1
12
each. When all the players are
12
included, player 1’s payoﬀ decreases again as now he is no longer essential in obtaining
the surplus. In the complete network, player 1 gets 3
5
and the other players get only 1
10
each. Players 2, 3, 4, and 5 get more if they do not include player 1; in the network in
which the 6 links between players 2, 3, 4, and 5 are formed, these players get 1
4
each.
However, any one of these players has the highest payoﬀ in a network where he alone
is linked with player 1. But players 2, 3, 4, and 5 prefer to form the 6 links amongst
themselves, excluding player 1, to linking up with player 1 and at least one other player
(with few votes).
It can be shown that only networks in which all links are formed within components
are supported by subgame-perfect Nash equilibria, so I restrict attention to those. I
identify the formation of all links between the players in a coalition T with the formation
of coalition T .
I use backward induction to find the coalitions whose formation is supported by
subgame-perfect Nash equilibria. Suppose coalition {1, 2, 3, 4}˙ has been formed. Then
players 2 and 5 can increase their payoﬀs (from 1
12
and 0, respectively, to 1
10
) by forming
a link, which eventually will result in the formation of coalition N . Hence, once a
coalition with player 1 and three players with few votes has been formed, the remaining
links will also be formed. Now, suppose that coalition {1, 2, 3} has been formed. It was
just shown that if any one of players 1, 2, or 3 forms an additional link with players
4 or 5, this will eventually result in the formation of coalition N . This would decrease
the payoﬀ of player 1 from 2
3
to 3
5
and that of players 2 and 3 form 1
6
to 1
10
. Hence, no
additional links will be formed once a coalition with player 1 and two players with few
votes has been formed. This implies that once coalition {1, 2} has been formed, player
1 can permanently improve his payoﬀ from 1
2
to 2
3
by forming a link with player 3. As
this will also improve player 3’s payoﬀ, a coalition with player 1 and one player with
few votes cannot be sustained in a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
Alternatively, suppose players 2, 3, 4, and 5 have formed a coalition. If one of
them forms a link with player 1, eventually the complete network will be formed, de-
creasing his payoﬀ from 1
4
to 1
10
. Hence, no additional links will be formed once coalition
{2, 3, 4, 5} has been formed.
The analysis above shows that only two types of networks can possibly be supported in
subgame-perfect Nash equilibria, coalitions like {1, 2, 3} with player 1 and two players
with few votes, and coalition {2, 3, 4, 5}. Note that players 2 through 5 each have a
higher payoﬀ in coalition {2, 3, 4, 5} than in either one of the coalitions that include
player 1 and two players with few votes. This implies that players 2 through 5 will
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refuse to form links with player 1 and form all links with each other. Hence, coalition
{2, 3, 4, 5} will be formed in a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
Aumann and Myerson (1988) mention that in apex games with a large player who
has more than one and less than q votes and several small players with one vote each,
in general the complete network on a minimal winning coalition of small players will
be formed in subgame-perfect Nash equilibria..
To the best of my knowledge, no general results for other types of weighted majority
games have been reported in the literature. Aumann and Myerson (1988) do, however,
report on two weighted majority situations with two large players each in which both
the coalitions with the large players and the coalitions with one large player and all
small ones are supported by subgame-perfect Nash equilibria.
The following example is due to Feinberg (1998). In response to a question posed
in Aumann and Myerson (1988), this example provides a weighted majority game and
a network that is not internally complete with the property that no additional links
will be formed in a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
Example 3 Consider the 8-player weighted majority situation in which the 8 players
have 5, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 4, and 1 votes, respectively, and the quota is 12 votes. The
characteristic function of the associated weighted majority game (N, v) assigns a worth
of 1 to every coalition T ⊆ N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8} if and only if Pi∈T wi ≥ 12 and
a worth of 0 otherwise. Feinberg (1998) shows that in the network-formation games
∆nf(N, v, µ,σ) it holds that, once the network (N, g) with
g = gN\{37, 47, 57, 67, 18, 48, 58, 68}
has been formed, no further links will be formed by the players. In this network, the
payoﬀs according to the Myerson value are
µ(N, v, g) =
µ
123
420
,
27
420
,
42
420
,
38
420
,
38
420
,
38
420
,
91
420
,
23
420
¶
.
The payoﬀs according to the Myerson value in the complete network are
µ(N, v, gN) =
µ
122
420
,
22
420
,
41
420
,
41
420
,
41
420
,
41
420
,
90
420
,
22
420
¶
.
This shows that the complete network is preferred to network (N, g) by players 4, 5, and
6, whereas all other players prefer network (N, g) to the complete network. However,
in network (N, g), players 4, 5, and 6 have already formed all links except those with
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players 7 and 8. Hence, players 7 and 8 can prevent players 4, 5, and 6 from forming
additional links. This shows that once network (N, g) is formed, no additional links will
be formed. It is still unknown whether there exists a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
of∆nf(N, v, µ,σ) that results in the formation of network (N, g) if the formation process
is started from the empty network.
4 Network-Formation Game in Strategic Form
The simplest game of network formation in coalitional games is the strategic-form game
that was mentioned briefly in Myerson (1991) (p. 448) and studied more extensively
in Dutta et al. (1998). In this game, the players each independently indicate the
set of other players with whom they would like to form bilateral relations. A link
is then formed between two players if both of them indicate they would like to form
a relation with each other. The payoﬀs to the players are those found by applying
an exogenous allocation rule to the network that is formed in combination with the
underlying coalitional game.
To describe the network-formation game in strategic form formally, let (N, v) be
a coalitional game and let γ be an allocation rule for communication situations. The
strategy set of player i ∈ N is Si = {T | T ⊆ N\i}, where a particular strategy
si ∈ Si represents the set of players with whom player i would like to form links. If
the players play a strategy tuple s = (si)i∈N ∈
Q
i∈N Si, then a link is formed between
two players i and j if and only if j ∈ si and i ∈ sj . Denote the set of all links that are
formed according to this rule by g(s). The network-formation game in strategic form
Γnf(N, v, γ) is described by the tuple (N ; (Si)i∈N ; (f
γ
i )i∈N), where f
γ
i (s) = γi(N, v, g(s))
for each s ∈ S.
A game Γnf(N, v, γ) will in general have many Nash equilibria. The reason for
this is that if a player i indicates that he does not want to form a link with another
player j, then it does not matter for the network formed (or the payoﬀs) whether or
not player j wants to form a link with player i, as this link will not be formed in
either case. This reasoning underlies theorem 1. To state this theorem formally, I
need the three logically independent properties of allocation rules for communication
situations that were used in Dutta et al. (1998). The class of allocation rules for
communication situations satisfying these three properties is reasonably large and it
contains, for example, the Myerson value on the class of communication situations with
a superadditive underlying game.
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Component Eﬃciency An allocation rule γ on a class CS of communication
situations satisfies component eﬃciency if for every communication situation
(N, v, g) ∈ CS and every component C ∈ π(N, g) it holds that Pi∈C γi(N, v, g) =
v(C).
Component eﬃciency of an allocation rule means that the players in a component
distribute the value of this component among themselves.
Weak Link Symmetry An allocation rule γ on a class CS of communication
situations satisfies weak link symmetry if for every communication situation
(N, v, g) ∈ CS and every link ij it holds that if γi(N, v, g ∪ ij) > γi(N, v, g)
then γj(N, v, g ∪ ij) > γj(N, v, g).8
Weak link symmetry is a form of fairness where the formation of a new link between
two players cannot strictly benefit just one of them.
Improvement Property An allocation rule γ on a class CS of communication
situations satisfies the improvement property if for every communication situation
(N, v, g) ∈ CS and every link ij it holds that if there exists a k ∈ N\{i, j}
such that γk(N, v, g ∪ ij) > γk(N, v, g), then γi(N, v, g ∪ ij) > γi(N, v, g) or
γj(N, v, g ∪ ij) > γj(N, v, g).
This property stipulates that the formation of a new link cannot benefit some player
who is not involved in the link without also benefitting at least one of the two players
forming it.
Dutta et al. (1998) showed that any allocation rule satisfying the three afore-
mentioned properties necessarily satisfies a fourth property, link monotonicity, if the
underlying coalitional game is superadditive. It states that forming an additional link
can never harm a player if the allocation rule is link monotonic.
Link Monotonicity An allocation rule γ on a class CS of communication situations
satisfies link monotonicity if for every communication situation (N, v, g) ∈ CS
and every link ij it holds that γi(N, v, g ∪ ij) ≥ γi(N, v, g).
8I omit details on domains on which a rule γ is defined, as the domains that are considered are
always closed with respect to the operations that appear in the properties.
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Even though link monotonicity plays an important and prominent role in many of
the results that are obtained for network-formation games Γnf(N, v, γ), Slikker and van
den Nouweland (2001a) demonstrate in examples that replacing weak link symmetry by
link monotonicity, even in a context where component eﬃciency and the improvement
property hold, will not guarantee the validity of the statements in the results that
are described below. Hence, link monotonicity should be viewed as an intermediate
result only, albeit one that is interesting enough to warrant highlighting it as a separate
property.
If an allocation rule satisfies link monotonicity, then a player never has an incentive
to change his strategy to prevent the formation of one or more of his links.9 This
implies that any network g can be supported by a Nash equilibrium of the network-
formation game, namely the strategy profile in which each agent i chooses his strategy
si = {j ∈ N | ij ∈ g}, indicating the will to form exactly the links in g in which he
is involved. In this strategy profile, no single player can induce the formation of an
additional link, as that would require a change in strategy by two players. A single
player could prevent the formation of one or more of his links, but has no incentive to
do so under link monotonicity. This shows the validity of the following theorem.
Theorem 1 (Dutta et al. (1998)) Let (N, v) be a superadditive coalitional game and
let γ be an allocation rule on CSNv that satisfies component eﬃciency, weak link sym-
metry, and the improvement property. Then any network g can be supported by a Nash
equilibrium of the network-formation game Γnf(N, v, γ).
A driving force behind this theorem is that it takes two players to form a link,
while the Nash equilibrium concept allows only single-player deviations. Hence, if two
players each do not indicate that they want to form a link with each other, then none
of them can unilaterally cause the link to be formed, even if its formation would benefit
the players. There are two ways around this. One is to consider undominated Nash
equilibria, and the other is to look at equilibrium refinements that allow for deviations
by multiple players.
In an undominated Nash equilibrium, if the formation of a link with another player
is beneficial to him, a player should indicate that he wants to form this link, even if the
other player does not do so and therefore the link will not be formed. The reason is
that if the first player is not certain whether the other player will want to form the link
9Note that this shows that link monotonicity implies that the strategy si = N\i is a weakly
dominant strategy for each player i ∈ N .
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or not, then he does not want to block the possibility of the link being formed. For
a superadditive coalitional game, the restriction to undominated strategies narrows
down the set of equilibria considerably. While there may be multiple undominated
Nash equilibria, they all result in the formation of a network in which the payoﬀs are
equal to those in the complete network, γ(N, v, gN). The complete network gN itself
is also supported by an undominated Nash equilibrium, the strategy profile s¯ defined
by s¯i = N\i for each i ∈ N .
Theorem 2 (Dutta et al. (1998)) Let (N, v) be a superadditive coalitional game and
let γ be an allocation rule on CSNv that satisfies component eﬃciency, weak link sym-
metry, and the improvement property. Then s is an undominated Nash equilibrium
of the network-formation game Γnf(N, v, γ). Moreover, if s is an undominated Nash
equilibrium of Γnf(N, v, γ), then γ(N, v, g(s)) = γ(N, v, gN).
Considering equilibrium refinements that allow for deviations by multiple players,
the most obvious such refinement is strong Nash equilibrium.. However, strong Nash
equilibria might not exist in the game Γnf(N, v, γ), not even under fairly strong re-
quirements on the underlying coalitional game.10 This motivates the consideration of
coalition-proof Nash equilibria, which also allow for deviations by multiple players,
but where these deviations are restricted to be immune to further allowed deviations
themselves. It turns out that for a superadditive coalitional game (N, v), there are no
existence problems for coalition-proof Nash equilibria in the network-formation game
Γnf(N, v, γ), as the complete network gN is always supported by a coalition-proof Nash
equilibrium. Moreover, even though there might be multiple networks supported by
coalition-proof Nash equilibria, the payoﬀs are the same in all of these networks. This
shows that, even though undominated Nash equilibria and coalition-proof Nash equilib-
ria may lead to very diﬀerent payoﬀs to the players for strategic-form games in general,
for the strategic-form games of network formation coalition-proof Nash equilibria lead
to similar outcomes as undominated Nash equilibria.
Theorem 3 (Dutta et al.(1998)) Let (N, v) be a superadditive coalitional game and let
γ be an allocation rule on CSNv that satisfies component eﬃciency, weak link symmetry,
and the improvement property. Then the strategy profile s¯ is a coalition-proof Nash
10Slikker and van den Nouweland (2001a) show that convexity of the underlying game does not
guarantee existence of strong Nash equilibria (example 7.4) and that balancedness is not necessary
for existence (example 7.5).
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equilibrium of the network-formation game Γnf(N, v, γ). Moreover, if s is a coalition-
proof Nash equilibrium of Γnf(N, v, γ), then γ(N, v, g(s)) = γ(N, v, gN).
A diﬀerent approach was taken by Qin (1996). He showed that for any coalitional
game (N, v) and any external allocation rule γ that is component eﬃcient, the strategic-
form network-formation game Γnf(N, v, γ) is a potential game if and only if γ = µ, i.e.,
if the exogenous allocation rule used is the Myerson value. The essence of the proof that
µ is the only component-eﬃcient allocation rule for which Γnf(N, v, γ) is a potential
game, consists of using a potential of Γnf(N, v, γ) to show that γ must satisfy fairness.
In his proof of the other implication, that Γnf(N, v, µ) is a potential game, Qin (1996)
used a sort of cyclicity property for potential games that was shown by Monderer
and Shapley (1996) to characterize games that admit a potential. Slikker and van
den Nouweland (2001a) provide a proof of this implication that uses a representation
theorem by Ui (2000), who shows that there is a relation between the existence of
potential functions for games in strategic form and Shapley values of coalitional games.
Because the network-formation games Γnf(N, v, µ) are potential games, for these
games the potential-maximizing strategy profiles provide an equilibrium refinement.
The following theorem shows that the application of this refinement leads to results
similar to those obtained for other refinements.
Theorem 4 (Qin (1996)) Let (N, v) be a superadditive coalitional game and let P be
a potential function for the network-formation game Γnf(N, v, µ). Then P assumes
its maximum value at s¯ and if s is a strategy profile in which P is maximal, then
µ(N, v, g(s)) = µ(N, v, gN).
The three theorems above show that undominated Nash equilibrium, coalition-proof
Nash equilibrium, and potential-maximizing strategies (when appropriate) all support
the formation of the complete network or a network that is payoﬀ equivalent to the
complete network when the underlying coalitional game is superadditive. Hence, all
three equilibrium concepts provide the same unique prediction on the ultimate payoﬀs
of the players, namely those associated with the complete network.11 However, the
11I point out that pairwise stability (see the chapter by Jackson (2004) in this volume) does not
provide the same unique predictions. While it is true that the complete network is pairwise stable if
the underlying coalitional game is superadditive, there may be networks that are not payoﬀ equivalent
to the complete network that are pairwise stable. The reason for this is that the pairwise stability
concept only considers the addition of one link at a time and this can make a smaller network pairwise
stable if the addition of more than one link is necessary to increase the payoﬀs to the players.
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theorems above do not necessarily imply that these three types of equilibria support
the same networks. They leave open the possibility that a non-complete network that is
payoﬀ equivalent to the complete network is supported by one equilibrium concept but
not by the other two. Little is known about exactly which networks are supported by
the various equilibrium concepts. Exceptions are Garratt and Qin (2001) and Garratt
et al. (2002), who shed some light on which networks are supported by potential-
maximizing strategy profiles of network-formation games Γnf(N, v, µ), specifically for
3-player coalitional games.
Slikker at al. (2000a) analyze hypergraph-formation games in strategic form. The
hypergraph-formation games that they study are straightforward extensions of the
strategic-form network-formation games Γnf(N, v, µ) to situations in which payers can
form multilateral relationships rather than just bilateral ones. They derive results
similar to theorems 1, 2, and 3 in this more general setting. In addition, they prove that
hypergraph-formation games are weighted potential games (cf. Monderer and Shapley
(1996)) if and only if a weighted Myerson value is used as exogenous allocation rule.
Using this, they are able to derive a result similar to theorem 4 for weighted potentials.
5 Comparison of the Network-Formation Models in
Extensive and Strategic Forms
The diﬀerences between the games of network formation in extensive form and the
games of network formation in strategic form are illustrated by considering the 3-
person game (N, v) with player set N = {1, 2, 3} in which the worth of every 1-player
coalition equals 0, that of every 2-player coalition equals 60, and that of the 3-player
grand coalition equals 72. This is the same game as in example 1. That example
illustrated that the prediction of the network-formation game in extensive form is that
a network with 1 link will be formed. The reason that no additional links are formed
is the following. Suppose that link ij has been formed. Then it seems beneficial for
player i to form a link with the third player, k, to increase the payoﬀ of player i from 30
to 44 and that of player k from 0 to 14. However, this would cause a drop in player j’s
payoﬀ from 30 to 14 and now players j and k have an incentive to form the third link
and increase each of their payoﬀs from 14 to 24. Note that the payoﬀ of player i falls
to 24 as a result oﬀ this. Hence, player i will not form the link with player k because
of player j’s threat to retaliate by forming a link with player k as well. Note that
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executing this threat is in player j’s best interest. Also, if all 3 links are formed, both
players i and j are worse oﬀ than then when only link ij is formed. Hence, the network
(N, {ij}) is sustained by a pair of mutual threats of the kind “If you form a link with
k, then so will I.” Note, however, that such mutual threats can only be eﬀective if the
negotiation process is public and player j can observe whether or not player i forms
a link with player k. These threats lose bite if bilateral negotiations are conducted
secretly, or when negotiations over diﬀerent links are carried out simultaneously rather
than sequentially and links cannot be broken once they have been formed. In such
situations, if player k starts negotiations with players i and j separately after link ij
has been formed, players i and j are basically playing the following game.
l nl
l 24,24 44,14
nl 14,44 30,30
Here, l and nl denote the strategies of forming a link with k and not forming a link
with k, respectively. In this game, it is a dominant strategy for both players i and j to
form a link with k. Note that this game describes a prisoners’ dilemma situation. It
shows that in the network-formation game in strategic form both players i and j will
form a link with player k, and the complete network will be formed, simply because
players i and j cannot sign a binding agreement to abstain from forming a link with k.
6 Network Formation with Costs for Establishing
Links
The network-formation games in extensive form and strategic form that were the sub-
ject of the previous two sections do not allow for the inclusion of costs for forming links.
In these models, the worth of a connected coalition of players is the same, whether they
are connected by a minimum number of links, by all possible links, or something in
between. Slikker and van den Nouweland (2000) investigate the eﬀects of introducing
costs for forming links into the two aforementioned games of link formation. To iso-
late the eﬀect that such costs have on the networks that are formed in equilibrium,
these costs are taken to be as simple as possible, namely constant across links. A
cost-extended communication situation is a tuple (N, v, g, c), in which N is a set of
players, (N, v) a coalitional game, (N, g) a communication network, and c ≥ 0 the cost
for establishing a communication link.
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When links are costly, the worth that a coalition of players can obtain does no longer
just depend on whether they are connected or not, but also on how many links they
have formed. As there are costs associated with forming additional links, players have
incentives to form only as many links as necessary to connect them to others. However,
forming an additional link will put a player in a more central position in a network and
might increase his payoﬀ. Therefore, a player needs to carefully balance the cost of an
additional link against its benefits. The inclusion of costs necessitates extending the
notion of an allocation rule. Slikker and van den Nouweland (2000) extend the Myerson
value and use this allocation rule in the link-formation games. To obtain the worth of
a coalition of players, we need to subtract the costs of the links formed by these players
from the benefits that they can obtain in the presence of these links. Hence, the worth
of a coalition T ⊆ N of players in cost-extended communication situation (N, v, g, c) is
vg,c(T ) =
X
C∈π(T,g)
v(C)− c |g(T )|.
The cost-extended Myerson value ν(N, v, g, c) is the Shapley value of the associated
cost-extended network-restricted game (N, vg,c), i.e.,
ν(N, v, g, c) = Φ(N, vg,c).
Note that ν(N, v, g, c) = µ(N, v, g) whenever c = 0, so that the cost-extended Myerson
value is indeed an extension of the Myerson value. The cost-extended Myerson value
can be interpreted in two methodologically very diﬀerent ways. One is as a solution
to the bargaining problem in which the players bargain over the benefits and the
costs of forming links simultaneously. This interpretation stems from the fact that the
definition of the cost-extended Myerson value is based on the game (N, vg,c), which
includes both the benefits and the costs of forming links. Another interpretation is
that players first form links and pay the costs for forming them and then, when a
network has been formed and the costs are sunk, bargain over the division of the
benefits. This interpretation stems form the fact that the cost-extended network-
restricted game (N, vg,c) can be written in terms of the network-restricted game (N, vg)
as vg,c = vg − cPij∈g ui,j,12 which implies that
νi(N, v, g, c) = µi(N, v, g)−
1
2
X
ij∈g
c
12ui,j denotes the characteristic function of the unanimity game on coalition {i, j} and is defined
by ui,j(T ) = 1 if {i, j} ⊆ T and ui,j(T ) = 0 otherwise, for all T ⊆ N .
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for each player i. This shows that benefits are allocated according to the Myerson
value, whereas the cost of each link is simply split between the players who form it.
Focusing on the networks rather than the players, a reward function rv,c can be
defined that assigns to each network g the net worth that the players can obtain in
this network;
rv,c(g) =
X
C∈π(N,g)
v(C)− c |g|.
Such a reward function is a special case of a value function as discussed in Jackson
(2004). Slikker and van den Nouweland (2001a) prove that the cost-extended Myerson
value is a special case of the Myerson value that is defined for such value functions in
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).
The trade-oﬀ between the costs and benefits of an additional link can be illustrated
by considering a 3-player symmetric coalitional game in which the worth of every 1-
player coalition equals v1 = 0, that of every 2-player coalition equals v2 ≥ 0, and that
of the grand coalition consisting of all 3 players equals v3 ≥ 0. Then in a network with
two links, a player who is involved in only one link has a cost-extended Myerson value
νi(N, v, {ij, jk}, c) = 13v3 − 16v2 − 12c. If this player were to form a link with the other
player who is involved in only one link, then the complete network would result and each
player’s cost-extended Myerson value would become νi(N, v, {ij, ik, jk}, c) = 13v3 − c.
Hence, player i would prefer to form this third link if and only if c < 1
3
v2, in which
case the extra benefit of being more central in the network (1
6
v2) outweighs the extra
cost of the link (1
2
c).
Using the cost-extended Myerson value, the eﬀect of costs for forming links can be
studied in both the extensive-form network-formation games ∆nf(N, v, c, ν,σ) and the
strategic-form network-formation games Γnf(N, v, c, ν). Slikker and van den Nouwe-
land (2000, 2001a, 2002) provide overviews that identify which networks are supported
by various equilibrium refinements of these games as the costs for forming links change.
They do so for all 3-player games where the underlying coalitional games are symmet-
ric and non-negative. Non-negativity basically means that cooperation is beneficial
in the sense that the worth of any multi-player coalition is at least that of the sum
of the individual worths of its members. I will not reproduce these overviews here.
Overviews for subgame-perfect Nash equilibria of the extensive-form games of network
formation and those for undominated Nash equilibria and coalition-proof Nash equi-
libria of the strategic-form games of network formation were first published in Slikker
and van den Nouweland (2000), while those for Nash equilibria are published in Slikker
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and van den Nouweland (2001a). Slikker and van den Nouweland (2002) extend earlier
results to cost-extended communication situations and show that for any coalitional
game (N, v), any non-negative cost c, and any component-eﬃcient external allocation
rule γ, the strategic-form network-formation game Γnf(N, v, c, γ) is a potential game
if and only if γ = ν, i.e., if the exogenous allocation rule used is the cost-extended
Myerson value. Hence, for the potential games Γnf(N, v, c, ν), potential maximizing
strategy profiles can be used as an equilibrium refinement and Slikker and van den
Nouweland (2002) provide overviews of networks supported by potential-maximizing
strategy profiles.
The most striking results obtained are discussed below.13
It turns out that for 3-player symmetric games (N, v) the pattern of equilibrium
networks as a function of changing costs for forming links depends on whether or
not the underlying game is superadditive and/or convex. This holds for both the
extensive-form games of network-formation and the strategic-form games of network
formation and also for all of the equilibrium concepts studied. It is well-known that
a convex game is superadditive, while the reverse implication is not true in general.
Hence, with respect to the network-formation games with costs for forming links, three
types of underlying games need to be considered. They are non-superadditive games,
superadditive games that are not convex, and convex games.
In strategic-form network-formation games, undominated Nash equilibrium, coalition-
proof Nash equilibrium, and potential-maximizing strategy profiles provide the most
useful predictions. Surprisingly, it turns out that for these games the predictions of
coalition-proof Nash equilibrium refine those of undominated Nash equilibrium at the
network level.14 Also, the patterns of networks supported by potential-maximizing
strategies are almost exactly the same as those for coalition-proof Nash equilibrium.15
Therefore, I concentrate on networks supported by coalition-proof Nash equilibria.
These are as follows. For all underlying coalitional games, the complete network is
supported for very low costs of link formation16 and the empty network (in which
13I remind the reader that the results discussed cover 3-player coalitional games that are symmetric,
zero-normalized, and non-negative.
14Note that coalition-proof Nash equilibrium is not a refinement of undominated Nash equilibrium
on the strategy level, not even for the class of strategic-form network-formation games.
15The only diﬀerence appears for nonsuperadditive games, where the level of the cost at which
the transition from the complete network to networks with 1 link occurs is higher for the potential-
maximizing strategy profiles than for coalition-proof Nash equilibria.
16If the game is non-superadditive, then the cut-oﬀ for ’very low’ costs might be negative, in which
case the complete network is not supported for any non-negative cost c.
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there are no links and, hence, every player is isolated) is supported for very high costs.
It is for intermediate cost levels that the predictions depend on the structure of the
underlying coalitional game.17 If that game is non-superadditive, then for intermediate
cost levels the formation of exactly one link is supported. If the underlying game is
convex, networks with two links are supported for intermediate cost levels. Finally,
if the coalitional game is superadditive but not convex, then networks with two links
are supported for lower costs, while for higher costs the formation of only one link is
supported.
In extensive-form network-formation games, subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium is
the most appropriate solution concept. The networks supported by subgame-perfect
Nash equilibria are as follows. If the underlying coalitional game is non-superadditive,
then for low costs only networks with one link are supported, while for high costs
only the empty network results. Networks with more than one link are not supported
for any level of the costs if the game is not superadditive. For convex coalitional
games, the complete network is supported for very low costs, networks with two links
are supported for intermediate costs, and the empty network is supported for very
high costs. The most interesting case turns out to be that of superadditive coalitional
games that are not convex. For such games, the number of links whose formation
is supported by coalition-proof Nash equilibria varies with the costs of forming links
in a non-monotonic way. For very low costs, networks with 3 links are supported.18
For somewhat higher costs, networks with one link are supported. Then, if the costs
increase from there, networks with two links are supported (so an increase in the costs
results in the formation of more links). If the costs keep increasing, the number of links
formed in equilibrium decreases again. First networks with 1 link are supported, while
for very high costs the empty network (with 0 links) is supported.
The following example illustrates that an increase in the cost for establishing a
communication link can result in more communication between the players in subgame-
perfect Nash equilibria of the extensive-form game of network formation.
Example 4 Let (N, v) be the 3-player symmetric game (N, v) in which the worth of
every 1-player coalition equals 0, that of every 2-player coalition equals 60, and that
of the 3-player grand coalition equals 72. Note that this game is superadditive but not
17The levels of costs that are considered intermediate vary with the structure of the coalitional
game.
18For some games in this class the cut-oﬀ for ’very low’ costs might be negative, in which case the
complete network is not supported for any non-negative cost c.
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convex. It is the same game as was studied in example 1, where it was shown that if
the cost for forming links is 0, only networks with one link are supported by subgame-
perfect Nash equilibria. For low costs of forming links (to be precise, for c < 20), the
discussion in example 1 is still valid, as is its conclusion that exactly one link will be
formed.
But the analysis changes if the costs are larger. I demonstrate this for c = 22. With
these costs, the cost-extended Myerson values are as follows. An isolated player (one
who is does not form any links) gets 0. In a network with 1 link, the two players who
have formed this link each get 19 (which is one half of the revenue of 60 minus the cost
of the link). In a network with 2 links, the central player (who has formed 2 links) gets
22, whereas the other two players each get 3. In the complete network, each player gets
2 (which is one third of the revenue of 72 minus the cots of the three links).
The higher costs change the incentives of the players. In a network with 2 links,
the two players who have not formed a link with each other have no incentive to do so,
because that would reduce their payoﬀs from 3 to 2. Then, in a network with 1 link, a
player who is involved in this link has an incentive to also form a link with the isolated
player. Doing this will increase his payoﬀ (from 19 to 22) and, unlike for lower levels
of the costs, there is no threat of the third link being formed later on. Clearly, at least
one link will be formed so that some players get a strictly positive payoﬀ. It follows
that networks with 2 links are supported by subgame-perfect Nash equilibria if the costs
are equal to 22. Note that this means that the increase of the cost, from say 19 to 22,
results in the formation of 2 links rather than 1.
The equilibrium concept for network-formation games in strategic form that is most
similar in spirit to subgame perfection is undominated Nash equilibrium. However,
there is a multiplicity of networks resulting from undominated Nash equilibria in the
strategic-form network-formation games and coalition-proof Nash equilibrium provides
a further refinement of these predictions. Therefore, a comparison of the cost-network
patterns for subgame-perfect Nash equilibria in the network-formation games in exten-
sive form with those for coalition-proof Nash equilibria in the network-formation games
in strategic form is appropriate. The predictions according to subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium in the games in extensive form and those according to coalition-proof Nash
equilibrium in the games in strategic form are remarkably similar. For convex games,
the predictions in the extensive-form games and those in the strategic-form games are
the same for all levels of the costs of link formation. For non-superadditive games, the
predictions in both network-formation games are almost the same. The only diﬀerence
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is that the level of the costs that marks the transition from the complete network to
a network with one link is possibly positive in the strategic-form game, whereas it is
always negative (and therefore does not show up in the overview) in the extensive-form
games.19 The predictions of both types of network-formation games are most dissimilar
if the underlying coalitional game is superadditive but not convex. In the extensive-
form game a network with one link is supported if the costs are fairly low, but not
very low, whereas in the strategic-form game for the same level of costs the complete
network is supported. For all other levels of the cost the predictions of both games are
the same. The diﬀerence between the predictions of both network-formation games is
a result of the validity of mutual threats in the network-formation game in extensive
form, as discussed in section 5, which is applicable to all games that are superaddi-
tive but not convex. These mutual threats also drive the remarkable result that higher
costs may result in the formation of more links in the extensive-form network-formation
game. Mutual threats will only be credible for lower costs, as for higher costs a player
who executes such a threat will permanently decrease his payoﬀ.
For games with more than 3 players, it is no longer true that the pattern of networks
formed in equilibrium depends only on whether a game is superadditive and/or convex.
Slikker and van den Nouweland (2000) illustrate this with two examples of symmetric
4-player games that are superadditive but not convex and for which the patterns of
equilibrium networks as a function of the cost of forming links are diﬀerent. However,
the most interesting result that is obtained for symmetric 3-player games, namely that
in the network-formation games in extensive form it is possible that the number of
links formed in subgame-perfect Nash equilibria increases as the cost for establishing
links increases, is still valid for games with more than 3 players. Slikker and van den
Nouweland (2000) illustrate this in an example of a 4-player game and also for n-player
games with n odd. In contrast, Slikker and van den Nouweland (2002) extend the
result that in strategic-form network-formation games the number of links formed in
potential-maximizing strategy profiles decreases as the costs for forming links increase.
They prove this for coalitional games with an arbitrary number of players that are not
necessarily symmetric.
19This level of the cost is higher and always positive if potential-maximizing strategies are used in
the strategic-form games of network formation.
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7 Simultaneous Bargaining over Network Forma-
tion and Payoﬀ Division
In the three previous sections, an exogenous allocation rule was used to determine
the payoﬀs to the players in various networks. This can be interpreted as network
formation and bargaining occurring in two sequential stages; the first stage is the
network-formation stage and in the second stage the players bargain over payoﬀs, given
the network formed in the first stage. The second stage is collapsed into an exogenous
allocation rule that provides the predicted outcome of the process of bargaining over
payoﬀs. In contrast, Slikker and van den Nouweland (2001b)20 study a model of network
formation in which players bargain over the formation of links and the division of the
payoﬀs simultaneously. In such a model, the use of an exogenous allocation rule is no
longer justified. The link and claim game provides an integrated approach to network
formation and payoﬀ division. Like in the games of network formation in extensive and
strategic forms of sections 3 and 4, it is built around a coalitional game (N, v) describing
the possibilities of cooperating coalitions of players. To keep notations as simple as
possible, it is assumed the game is zero-normalized, i.e., v(i) = 0 for each player i ∈ N .
The link and claim game Γlc(N, v) is a strategic-form game (N ; (Si)i∈N ; (fi)i∈N) with
strategies and payoﬀ functions as described below. The strategy set of player i is
Si = {c
i ∈ AN | cii = P},
where A := IR+ ∪ {P}, IR+ = [0,∞), and P stands for Pass. A strategy for player i
specifies a cij ∈ IR+ ∪ {P} for any player j ∈ N . The interpretation of cij = P is that
player i is not willing to form a link with player j, and cij ∈ IR+ means that player i is
willing to form a link with player j provided that he gets the amount of his claim cij
for forming it. As player i cannot form a link with himself, it is assumed that cii = P
for all ci ∈ Si. Suppose the players play strategy profile c = (ci)i∈N ∈
Q
i∈N Si. The
resulting payoﬀs to the players depend on the network that is formed. According to
strategy profile c, the set l(c) of links that the players are willing to form is
l(c) = {ij | cji , c
i
j ∈ IR+}
as the consent of both players is needed to form the link between them. However, the
claims of the players for forming these links might add up to more than is available.
20Most results in this section are taken from Slikker and van den Nouweland (2001b). However,
they also appear in chapter 9 in Slikker and van den Nouweland (2001a), where they are presented
more extensively and where the proofs are clearer, in my opinion.
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Hence, it needs to be determined which of the links in l(c) carry feasible claims. Net-
work (N, l(c)) partitions the player set into components. For every such component,
the links in l(c) between its members can only be formed if the total of the claims for
these links does not exceed the worth of the coalition. Hence, the set g(c) of links that
are formed equals
g(c) = {ij ∈ l(c) |
X
km∈l(c):k,m∈Ci(l(c))
(ckm + c
m
k ) · v(Ci(l(c)))},
where Ci(l(c)) denotes the component of network (N, l(c)) that contains player i. This
construction of g(c) implies that if the players in a component of (N, l(c)) collectively
claim too much, they all end up being isolated.21 The payoﬀs to the players can be
found by adding their claims for the links that are actually formed;
fi(c) =
X
j:ij∈g(c)
cij.
22
Note that this gives an isolated player his stand-alone payoﬀ of zero.
The link and claim game Γlc(N, v) is illustrated in the following example.
Example 5 Let (N, v) be the 3-person coalitional game with N = {1, 2, 3} and char-
acteristic function v with v(T ) = 0 if |T | = 1, v(T ) = 30 if |T | = 2, and v(T ) = 72 if
T = N . Consider the strategy profile
c = (c1, c2, c3) = ((P, 10, 10), (10, P, 10), (P, 10, P ))
in the link and claim game Γlc(N, v). The link between players 1 and 3 is not in l(c),
because, while player 1 would like to form this link (c13 = 10 ∈ IR+), player 3 does not
(c31 = P ). Link 12 is in l(c), because both players 1 and 2 want to form it. Proceeding
in this way, it is found that l(c) = {12, 23}. The network (N, l(c)) has one component,
π(N, l(c)) = {{1, 2, 3}}. The total of the payoﬀs claimed for forming the links in l(c)
equals c12 + c
2
1 + c
2
3 + c
3
2 = 40 · 72 = v(N). As these claims are feasible for coalition
N , all links in l(c) are formed and g(c) = {12, 23}. The corresponding payoﬀs to the
players are f1(c) = c
1
2 = 10, f2(c) = c
2
1 + c
2
3 = 20, and f3(c) = c
3
2 = 10.
21See Slikker and van den Nouweland (2001a) for a discussion of alternative approaches.
22Note that this definition leaves open the possibility that the players claim less than what is
available. This, however, will never happen in a Nash equilibrium and so it does not really matter
whether the remainder is burned (as is the case for the expression that I provide here) or, for example,
divided evenly among the players.
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The profile cˆ = ((P, 20, 20), (20, P, P ), (P, 20, P )) is an example of a strategy profile
in which the players claim too much for all the links in l(cˆ) to be formed. It holds that
l(cˆ) = {12} and cˆ12 + cˆ
2
1 = 40 > 30 = v(1, 2). Hence, g(cˆ) = ∅ and fi(cˆ) = 0 for every
i ∈ N .
For link and claim games the question is not only which networks are supported
by (refinements of) Nash equilibria, but also which payoﬀ vectors are supported. For
any coalitional game (N, v) it holds that a strategy profile in Γlc(N, v) is not a Nash
equilibrium if it results in the formation of a network containing a cycle and if at least
one player claims a positive amount on one of the links in the cycle. A cycle is a path
i1, i2, ..., it+1 in which i1, i2, ..., it are all diﬀerent players and it+1 = i1.
Theorem 5 (Slikker and van den Nouweland (2001b)) Let (N, v) be a zero-normalized
coalitional game. For every Nash equilibrium c in the link and claim game Γlc(N, v) it
holds that all claims on links in cycles in g(c) are equal to zero.
I illustrate this theorem in the following example.
Example 6 Consider the 3-player game (N, v) in example 5. The complete network
is the only possible network for the 3 players that contains a cycle. This network can
only be formed if the players play a strategy profile c with cij ∈ IR+ for each i, j ∈ N ,
i 6= j, and c12 + c
1
3 + c
2
1 + c
2
3 + c
3
1 + c
3
2 · 72. If c is a Nash equilibrium of Γ
lc(N, v),
then no player can gain from unilaterally deviating to a strategy in which he simply
raises one of his claims. Hence, c12 + c
1
3 + c
2
1 + c
2
3 + c
3
1 + c
3
2 = 72 has to hold. Without
loss of generality, assume that c12 > 0, so that player 1 gets a positive amount for
forming link 12. Player 2 can increase his payoﬀ by refusing to form link 12 and
claiming the amount c12 for himself by playing strategy cˆ
2 = (P,P, c21 + c
2
3 + c
1
2).
Then network (N, {13, 23}) will be formed, and the players can still obtain v(N) = 72.
Hence, f2(c1, cˆ2, c3) = c
2
1 + c
2
3 + c
1
2 > c
2
1 + c
2
3 = f2(c). This demonstrates that player 2
has a profitable deviation from c, so that c is not a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 5 implies that for a zero-normalized coalitional game (N, v) with at least
three players and a positive value for the grand coalition (v(N) > 0), Nash equilibria
do not support the formation of the complete network. Therefore, attention is shifted
to connected networks. As is argued in example 6, if a connected network is formed
in a Nash equilibrium, then the payoﬀs must be eﬃcient for the underlying coalitional
game, i.e. sum up to v(N). Slikker and van den Nouweland (2001b) prove that in
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general a plethora of eﬃcient payoﬀ vectors are supported by Nash equilibria of the
link and claim game Γlc(N, v).23 One of their main results is that all payoﬀs in the core
are supported by Nash equilibria. The core of a coalitional game (N, v) consists of all
eﬃcient payoﬀ vectors such that the members of each coalition T ⊆ N collectively get
at least the worth v(T ) that they can obtain independently of the players who are not
included in the coalition; core(N, v) = {x ∈ IRN | Pi∈T xi ≥ v(T ) for all T ⊆ N andP
i∈N xi = v(N)}.
Theorem 6 (Slikker and van den Nouweland (2001b)) For any zero-normalized coali-
tional game (N, v) it holds that for every payoﬀ vector x ∈ core(N, v) there exists a
Nash equilibrium c of the link and claim game Γlc(N, v) such that f(c) = x.
As Nash equilibrium itself supports very many payoﬀ vectors, focus is shifted to
strong Nash equilibria in an attempt to generate clearer predictions. An example shows
that strong Nash equilibria of the link and claim game may support payoﬀ vectors that
are not eﬃcient for the underlying coalitional game.
Example 7 Let (N, v) be the 4-person coalitional game with player set N = {1, 2, 3, 4}
and characteristic function v with v(T ) = 0 if |T | = 1, v(T ) = 2 if |T | = 2 or |T | = 3,
and v(T ) = 3 if T = N . The strategy profile c with c1 = (P, 1, P, P ), c2 = (1, P, P, P ),
c3 = (P, P, P, 1), and c4 = (P,P, 1, P ) is a strong Nash equilibrium of Γlc(N, v). It
results in the formation of the network (N, {12, 34}) and payoﬀ vector f(c) = (1, 1, 1, 1).
This payoﬀ vector is not eﬃcient for the game (N, v) because the sum of the payoﬀs
equals 4 whereas the worth of the grand coalition equals only 3.
The result in the previous example stems from the fact there exists a partition of
the player set into coalitions such that the sum of the worths of these coalitions is
larger than the worth of the grand coalition. Slikker and van den Nouweland (2001b)
show that if the game (N, v) is such that a partition with this property does not exist,
then every strong Nash equilibrium of the link and claim game Γlc(N, v) results in a
payoﬀ vector that is not only eﬃcient, but even in the core of the coalitional game
(N, v). This, of course, implies that for such a coalitional game the set of strong Nash
equilibria of Γlc(N, v) is empty if the core of (N, v) is empty. The following example
illustrates that not all payoﬀ vectors in the core are necessarily supported by strong
Nash equilibria.
23A Nash equilibrium c supports payoﬀ vector x if f(c) = x.
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Example 8 Consider the coalitional game (N, v) with player set N = {1, 2, 3} and
v(T ) = 0 if |T | = 1, v(1, 2) = 120, v(1, 3) = 60, v(2, 3) = 80, and v(N) = 180.
Payoﬀ vector (60, 60, 60) is in the core of this game. I will show that there is no strong
Nash equilibrium that results in payoﬀ vector (60, 60, 60) by showing that every Nash
equilibrium that supports this payoﬀ vector cannot be strong. Suppose that c is a Nash
equilibrium of Γlc(N, v) such that f(c) = (60, 60, 60). It follows from theorem 5 that
(N, g(c)) must have two links.
Suppose that g(c) = {12, 23}. Together with f(c) = (60, 60, 60), this implies that
c2 = (c21, P, 60 − c21) for some 0 · c21 · 60, c1 = (P, 60, c13), and c3 = (c31, 60, P ),
where either c13 = P or c
3
1 = P (or both). Because f2(c) = 60, either c
2
1 > 0 or c
2
3 =
60− c21 > 0 (or both). Without loss of generality, assume that c23 > 0. Strategy profile c
is not a strong Nash equilibrium because players 1 and 3 can increase their payoﬀs by
deviating to strategies (cˆ1, cˆ3) defined by cˆ1 = (P, 60,
c23
2
) and cˆ3 = (60 +
c23
2
, P, P ). The
strategy profile (cˆ1, c2, cˆ3) results in the formation of links 12 and 13 and payoﬀ vector
(60 +
c23
2
, c21, 60 +
c23
2
), which means that players 1 and 3 both improved their payoﬀs
through the deviation.
It can be demonstrated in a similar manner that c is not a strong Nash equilibrium if
g(c) = {12, 13} or g(c) = {13, 23}. This shows that there is no strong Nash equilibrium
of Γlc(N, v) that supports payoﬀ vector (60, 60, 60).
The reasoning above exploits the feature of the payoﬀ vector (60, 60, 60) that all its
elements are positive, so that any strategy profile c that supports this payoﬀ vector leads
to a middleman who gets a positive payoﬀ. This idea can be extended and leads to the
conclusion that none of the payoﬀ vectors in which all coordinates are positive can be
supported by a strong Nash equilibrium. For a payoﬀ vector in the core like (70, 110, 0),
in which one of the players has a payoﬀ of zero, a similar reasoning as before cannot be
applied. Indeed, the payoﬀ vector (70, 110, 0) is supported by the strong Nash equilibrium
c in which c1 = (P,P, 70), c2 = (P,P, 110), and c3 = (0, 0, P ).
The results in example 8 hold in general. The following theorem identifies the payoﬀ
vectors that are supported by strong Nash equilibria of the link and claim game. The
first part identifies a class of games for which the set of payoﬀ vectors supported by
strong Nash equilibria coincides with the core of the underlying coalitional game, while
the second part describes a class of games for which the payoﬀ vectors supported by
strong Nash equilibria are all the payoﬀ vectors in the core in which at least one of the
players receives a zero payoﬀ.
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Theorem 7 (Slikker and van den Nouweland (2001b)) Let (N, v) be a zero-normalized
coalitional game with the property that v(N) ≥ Ptk=1 v(Bk) for all partitions {B1, . . . , Bt}
of N , and let Γlc(N, v) be the corresponding link and claim game.
(i) If there exists a partition {B1, . . . , Bt} of N such that |Bk| = 2 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , t}
and v(N) =
Pt
k=1 v(Bk), then
{f(c) | c is a strong Nash equilibrium of Γlc(N, v)} = core(N, v).
(ii) If v(N) >
Pt
k=1 v(Bk) for all partitions {B1, . . . , Bt} of N in which |Bk| = 2 for
each k ∈ {1, . . . , t}24, then
{f(c) | c is a strong Nash equilibrium of Γlc(N, v)} =
{x ∈ core(N, v) | there exists a player i ∈ N such that xi = 0}.
Theorem 7 shows that, while strong Nash equilibria of the link and claim games
often exist, the strong Nash equilibrium concept seems quite restrictive as it results in
at least one of the players receiving a payoﬀ of zero for a large class of coalitional games.
One of the players receiving a zero payoﬀmight even be the central player in a star. The
reason that the payoﬀ of a player in such a central position is kept low in a strong Nash
equilibrium is that other players can avoid having to communicate via him by forming
new links between themselves. However, such deviations are not necessarily stable
against further deviations. This motivates the consideration of coalition-proof Nash
equilibria. The following example demonstrates how the requirement that deviations
are self-enforcing prevents the players from making certain deviations, so that some
strategies that are not stable against arbitrary deviations become sustainable.
Example 9 Consider the coalitional game (N, v) in example 8 and payoﬀ vector x =
(60, 60, 60), which is in the core of (N, v) but not supported by a strong Nash equilibrium
of the associated link and claim game Γlc(N, v). Consider strategy profile c defined by
c1 = (P, 60, P ), c2 = (0, P, 60), and c3 = (P, 60, P ), for which g(c) = {12, 23} and
f(c) = x. It is shown below that c is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium of Γlc(N, v),
which shows that x is supported by a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium.
It is easily seen that c is a Nash equilibrium as no player can unilaterally deviate to
a strategy that gives him a higher payoﬀ. Further, there are no deviations by coalition
24Note that this condition is trivially satisfied for a game (N, v) with an odd number of players.
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N that increase the payoﬀs of all players as x1 + x2 + x3 = 180 = v(N). Hence, to
prove that c is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, it suﬃces to show that there are no
profitable deviations by 2-player coalitions that are stable against further deviations by
members of the deviating coalition.
Start by considering a deviation by coalition {1, 2}. When c is played, players 1 and
2 together receive 120, which is the worth of coalition {1, 2}. Hence, to improve their
payoﬀs, players 1 and 2 need to deviate to a strategy profile that results in the formation
of at least one link with player 3. Because player 3 is still playing strategy (P, 60, P ),
this will have to be link 23 and player 3 will still receive 60 after the deviation by
coalition {1, 2}. But then players 1 and 2 together cannot obtain more than v(N)−60 =
120 = x1 + x2 after the deviation, so they cannot both improve their payoﬀs. Similar
arguments show that there are no profitable deviations by coalition {2, 3}.
It remains to consider deviations by coalition {1, 3}. Because x1 + x3 = 120 >
v(1, 3), any profitable deviation by players 1 and 3 has to result in the formation of a
connected network. To improve their payoﬀs, players 1 and 3 have to break a link with
player 2 on which player 2 has a positive claim. Hence, link 23 will be broken. This is
represented by the strategies
cˆ1 = (P, cˆ12, cˆ
1
3) with cˆ
1
2 + cˆ
1
3 = 60 + 60α, 0 < α < 1,
cˆ3 = (60 + 60β, P, P ) with 0 < β · 1− α.
However, player 1 can deviate from strategy profile (cˆ1, c2, cˆ3) by playing c˜1 = (P, 120, P ),
which induces the formation of network (N, {12}) and improves his payoﬀ from 60+60α
to 120 = v(1, 2) − c21. Because c˜1 is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium in the reduced
game that emerges when the strategies of players 2 and 3 are fixed to c2 and cˆ3, re-
spectively, it follows that deviation (cˆ1, cˆ3) is not self-enforcing. We conclude that c is
coalition-proof Nash equilibrium of Γlc(N, v).
Slikker and van den Nouweland (2001a) provide a description of all coalition-proof
Nash equilibria of the link and claim game Γlc(N, v) and corresponding payoﬀs for
coalitional games (N, v) with three players. A remarkable result is that for some
coalitional games with a non-empty core, some eﬃcient payoﬀ vectors that are not in
the core of the game are nevertheless supported by coalition-proof Nash equilibria. For
the game (N, v) of examples 8 and 9, the eﬃcient payoﬀ vector (100, 10, 70) is supported
by the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium c = (c1, c2, c3) defined by c1 = (P, P, 100),
c2 = (P, P, 10), and c3 = (70, 0, P )25, but it is not in the core of (N, v) (players 1 and 2
25See lemma 9.2 in Slikker and van den Nouweland (2001a).
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get less than v(1, 2)). The results in Slikker and van den Nouweland (2001a) also imply
that there exist coalition-proof Nash equilibria of the link and claim game Γlc(N, v)
that result in eﬃcient payoﬀ vectors even if the core of the game (N, v) is empty, as
long as v(T ) · v(N) for at least one 2-player coalition T .
Slikker (2000) shows that all the results obtained in Slikker and van den Nouwe-
land (2001a) on coalition-proof Nash equilibria still hold for something which he calls
adjusted coalition-proof Nash equilibria. Adjusted coalition-proof Nash equilibrium is
similar to coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, but it limits the size of deviating coalitions
to be less than or equal to two. This is an especially appealing limitation in a setting of
network formation, where each link is formed by two players and where a single player
can break links.
8 Related Literature
In this chapter I have discussed the literature on the formation of networks in coali-
tional games. A coalitional game describes the possible gains from cooperation for all
coalitions of players. The question of which coalitions will be formed by the players in a
coalitional game is still largely unresolved. Models of network formation in coalitional
games approach this question by adding structure to the game and thereby making it
possible to consider bilateral cooperation that facilitates cooperation by larger coali-
tions of players. A network is a collection of bilateral relations between the players and
as such networks can be viewed as a generalization of a coalition structures in the sense
that a coalition of players can be identified with a network in which all the members
of the coalition have formed bilateral links with each other. Hence, a coalition struc-
ture is a collection of complete networks. This is formalized in Slikker and van den
Nouweland (2001a), who show that the value for games with coalition structures intro-
duced in Aumann and Dre`ze (1974) coincides with the value for games with networks
introduced in Myerson (1977) for the networks that model the coalition structures as
described above. Networks are more general than coalition structures because they
allow for non-transitivity of bilateral relations. This opens up the possibility to model
communication between players who have no direct relation, but who do have indirect
relations via other players who act as intermediates. Just like for coalition structures,
players who have no direct or indirect relations cannot eﬀectively communicate and
hence not cooperate. For players who can communicate, the worth that they can ob-
tain by cooperating is modeled by a coalitional game. In this approach, the value of a
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network primarily depends on which players it connects with one another (directly or
indirectly) and not on how exactly it connects these players (the only exception being
a model in which links are costly, see section 6). Hence, issues such as the deterioration
of information as it has to travel along longer paths are not taken into account. When
we want to take these types of issues into account, we end up with models in which
the worth of players in networks is given by a value function rather than derived from
a coalitional game. The literature on networks with value functions is covered in Jack-
son (2004), Chapter 2 in this volume. Also, the approach based on coalitional games
precludes externalities between diﬀerent groups of interconnected players. Currarini
(2002) looks at the formation of networks in situations where such externalities can
exist.26
There is a lively literature on the tensions between stability of networks and their
eﬃciency in the sense of overall payoﬀ maximization. Jackson (2004) includes a discus-
sion of this literature. Mostly, the models that I discuss illustrate this tension, which
was shown in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) to be quite pervasive even in settings of
more general value functions than those based on coalitional games.
In this chapter, I concentrated on the basic models of network formation in which
players form bilateral relations that are deterministic and symmetric and in which the
possibilities of coalitions of player are given by a coalitional game with transferable
utility. I believe that most of the issues that arise when studying network formation in
coalitional games, arise for this basic model. I refer the reader to Myerson (1980), van
den Nouweland et al. (1992), and Slikker et al. (2000a) for extensions to situations
in which players can form multilateral relations, to Calvo et al. (1999) for extensions
to situations in which bilateral relations are not deterministic, to Slikker and van
den Nouweland (2001a) and Casas-Me´ndez and Prada-Sa´nchez (2003) for situations in
which utilities are not transferable, and to Slikker et al. (2000b) for situations in which
players form relations that are not symmetric. For a much more elaborate treatment
of the subject of network formation in coalitional games than I could provide in this
survey, I refer the reader to Slikker and van den Nouweland (2001a), where the reader
will also find most of the proofs that I have omitted in this chapter.
26All of these paper look at static models of network formation. For a survey of the research on
learning in networks I refer the reader to Goyal (2004), Chapter 5 in this volume.
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